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I. INTRODUCTION
As U.S. states and foreign nations began recognizing same-sex
marriages over the last dozen years, the anti-gay definitions of
"marriage" and "spouse" in Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA") rendered those marriages invisible for immigration
purposes. Thousands of U.S. citizens were left with a cruel choice
between country and family: Remain alone in the United States or
start anew with spouses and stepchildren abroad. 1 Other couples did
not qualify to emigrate anywhere together, leaving them no choice at
all.2 DOMA also devastated children. Not only might they be
separated from one parent, but their own immigration or even
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reviewing an early manuscript, and I thank everyone at Immigration Equality, past and present,
for all the work they've done for binational same-sex couples and their children.
1.
Scott Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: ImmigrationRules and Their Implicationsfor
Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537, 539-40
(2010).
2.
Many countries restrict immigration to immediate family members of citizens, highly
skilled workers, the well-heeled, and refugees from state persecution. Thus U.S. citizens, whose
foreign spouses were not from countries recognizing lesbian and gay relationships do not all
qualify to emigrate, even if they were willing to leave their homes and jobs.
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citizenship status often hinged on definitions of terms like "stepchild"
3
and "born in wedlock."
When the Supreme Court struck down Section 3 of DOMA in
United States v. Windsor,4 it eliminated a categorical barrier to
immigration for thousands of families. Yet Windsor was not an
immigration case, and the Court's opinion did not address at least
three resulting immigration questions: What if a same-sex couple
legally marries in one jurisdiction but resides in a state that does not
recognize the marriage? What if the couple is in a legally-recognized
"civil union" or "registered partnership"? How about children born to
spouses or registered partners in same-sex couples: will they be
recognized as "born in wedlock" for immigration purposes?
The Obama administration appears to have answered the first
question, concluding that same-sex spouses who celebrate their
marriage in a jurisdiction where it is valid are married for
immigration purposes, even if they reside in a state where it is not
valid. In the context of immigration law, this uniform place-ofcelebration rule rests on firm legal, precedential, and policy ground.
As described below, the last two questions have not been resolved.

II. A UNIFORM PLACE-OF-CELEBRATION RULE
The terms "marriage" and "spouse" are scattered liberally
throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), determining
eligibility for everything from family-based immigrant visas to
waivers of deportability and bars on admission. 5 In fact, the vast
majority of U.S. immigration is based on such close family
relationships.6 This is no accident. Family unification has been the
bedrock principle of U.S. immigration policy and law for a very long
time. 7
Because the stakes are so high, federal immigration authorities
closely examine individual marriages, deeming them bona fide only if
they were not entered for the purpose of obtaining immigration
benefits.8 However, the INA is largely silent about what categories of

3.
See Scott Titshaw, A Modest Proposal: to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens, & etc.:
Immigration Law, the Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 407, 411, 415-20 (2011).
4.
133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
5.
Titshaw, supra note 1, at 547-49.
6.
Id. at 546-47.
7.
Stephen H. Legomsky, Rationing Family Values in Europe and America: An
Immigration Tug of War Between States and Their Supra-NationalAssociations, 25 Geo. Immigr.
L. J. 807, 808 (2011).
8.
8 U.S.C. §1186a. Same-sex spouses now must demonstrate these same bona fides.
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marriage it will recognize for immigration purposes. Immigration
authorities and judges have relied, therefore, on state and foreign
family law to determine whether a disputed type of marriage or
divorce is valid for immigration purposes. 9 The U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized that such federal reliance on state family law is
appropriate since "there is no federal law of domestic relationships,
which is primarily a matter of state concern." 10 But which state law
applies when married couples cross state lines?
In the case of same-sex marriage, President Obama has made
his policy preference clear: "If you've been married in Massachusetts
and you move someplace else, you're still married, and ... under
federal law you should be able to obtain the benefits of any lawfully
married couple.""1 Although he also recognized that such a uniform
place-of-celebration rule may not be legally possible in all federal
contexts,1 2 his Administration has now adopted that rule in the
context of federal immigration law.
The Department of State has clearly announced: "If your
marriage is valid in the jurisdiction (U.S. state or foreign country)
where it took place, it is valid for immigration purposes."1 3 U.S.
consulates abroad will apply this place-of-celebration rule even for
couples planning to reside in a state that will not recognize their
marriage.14
The Justice Department's Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") has published an opinion recognizing the validity of a New
Jersey couple's same-sex marriage, focusing solely on the law of
Vermont where it was celebrated. 15 The Department of Homeland
Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service ("USCIS") has
also issued guidance recognizing this uniform place-of-celebration
rule,1 6 and two of the first same-sex marriage cases it approved
involved Florida and Colorado couples married in New York and Iowa.

9.
See Titshaw, supra note 1, at 564-79.
10. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (focusing on state domestic law to
determine whether a child was "legitimate" and, therefore, covered by the term "children" under
federal copyright law).
11.
Chris Johnson, Obama Talks DOMA, gay rights in Africa, WASH. BLADE, June 27,
2013, http://www.washingtonblade.com/2013/06/27/in-africa-obama-talks-doma-gay-rights/.
12. Id. ("But I'm speaking as a President, not a lawyer.").
13.
U.S. Visas for Same-Sex Spouses: FAQs for Post-Defense of Marriage Act,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/frvi_6036.html.
14. Next Steps on DOMA Guidance for Posts (unclassified state 00112850) (Aug.2013),
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/NextSteps-OnDOMAGuidance For PostsAugust-2013.pdf.
15.
Matter of Zeleniak, 26 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA 2013).
16. In early August, USCIS replaced more ambiguous initial guidance with clearer
language favoring a uniform place-of-celebration focus. Implementation of the Supreme Court
Ruling
on
the
Defense
of
Marriage
Act
FA Q
(Aug.
2,
2013),
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The uniform place-of-celebration rule for recognizing same-sex
marriage comports with the expectations of both Democratic and
Republican lawmakers who recently dodged an amendment to
recognize same-sex partners under the Senate's comprehensive
immigration reform bill by arguing that DOMA's judicial demise
would eliminate immigration inequality for all married same-sex
couples. 17 It is also consistent with well-established guidance on
marriages involving transgender spouses under the INA.
Until Windsor struck down DOMA's federal rejection of samesex marriages, transgender spouses were required to demonstrate that
their unions qualified as valid different-sex marriages under state
law. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have focused on the
place of marriage celebration to make that determination, although
some states of domicile would not recognize gender reassignment for
marriage or other purposes.1 8 The USCIS even allows fianc6(e)
petitioners who indicate a specific intent to marry in a jurisdiction
where the marriage would not be valid "the opportunity to submit...
an affidavit attesting that the intended marriage will take place in a
19
jurisdiction where" it will be valid for immigration purposes.
There is some older authority refusing to recognize marriages
of close relatives and biracial couples for immigration purposes due to
strong public policy objections by the couples' state of domicile. 20 One
scholar has suggested the old-fashioned concept of marital domicile on
which these exceptions were based no longer fits an age of increased
mobility and spousal equality. 2 1 In any event, the relevant published
opinions are distinguishable from modern same-sex marriage cases
since the exceptions they recognized were based on enforced state
22
criminal statutes prohibiting cohabitation or evasion of state law.

http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb ld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
-2543215c310af310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel-2543215c310af310VgnVC
M100000082ca60aRCRD.
17.
Ryan Lizza, What the DOMA Decision Means for Immigration Reform, The New
Yorker, June 26, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/onlinetlogs/newsdesk/2013/06/what-thedoma-decision-means-for-immigration-reform.html.
18. Matter of Lovo-Lara, 23 I & N Dec. 746 (BIA) (2005); USCIS Adjudicator's Field
Manual § 21.3(a)(2)(J) [hereinafter A.M.].
19. A.FM., supra note 18, at § 21.3(a)(2)(J).
20. Scott Titshaw, supra note 1, at 565-73 (2010); See also e.g., A.FM., supra note 18, at §§
21.3(a)(2)(C). Some valid state marriages would also be invalid for immigration purposes due to
an express federal public policy objection such as the bar on admissibility of practicing
polygamists, 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(10)(A), as same-sex marriages were invalid under the federal
policy of DOMA §3 before Windsor.
21. Kerry Abrams, Marriage and Immigration
Which State's Law Applies?,
http://www.concurringopinions.com.
22. Titshaw, supra note 1, at 565-73.

2013]

IMMIGRATION FOR SAME-SEX SPOUSES

Similar criminal treatment of same-sex cohabitation or out-of-state
23
marriage would likely be invalid after Lawrence v. Texas.
In addition to its consistency with precedent, a uniform placeof-celebration rule implements immigration law's bedrock principle of
family unification. It would substantially undermine this principle if
qualification for married couples to enter the United States and live
together turned on the U.S. citizens' state of residence. Imagine a
federal immigration system that only allowed a U.S. citizen to live
with her foreign national wife and stepchild if she moved from
Tennessee to a state that respects her marriage. Such hyperfederalism would result in a new, interstate version of the dilemma
previously faced by same-sex, binational couples under DOMA:
Tennesseans would have to choose between life alone in Tennessee or
starting anew with their families in another state. This would
undermine the freedom of interstate movement and the concept of
national citizenship embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment for U.S.
citizens with same-sex, foreign partners.
An immigration rule that conditions recognition of same-sex
marriages on states of residence would also dramatically restrict
interstate and international commerce, even in cases not involving
U.S. citizens. Entrepreneurs and employers would have to consider
the marriage law of worksite locations as a significant factor in
determining where to locate or to base married lesbian and gay
employees. (Of course, this issue would arise outside the immigration
context as well, but other missing benefits would not directly prohibit
married couples from living together in the same state.)
Although the majority opinion in United States v. Windsor
included a great deal of language about Section 3 of DOMA
undermining states' traditional authority over family law, federalism
was not its ultimate rationale. In the end, Justice Kennedy found it
unnecessary to decide whether the federal intrusion on state power is
a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance"
since DOMA presents discrimination of an unusual character and
thereby "violates basic due process and equal protection principles"
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.2 4 On this point, the opinion
echoed the refrains of equality, personhood and dignity in choice of
intimate and familial relationships that featured prominently in
Justice Kennedy's opinions in Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v.
Evans.25 These ideas also support a unified place-of-celebration rule
for marriage validity. As Justice Scalia points out in dissent, Windsor
23.
24.
25.

539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding Texas's homosexual sodomy law unconstitutional).
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2692.
Id. at 2694--95.
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also supports a constitutional requirement of full marriage equality
for same-sex couples. 26 While the Court has not yet taken that step, it
has made clear that government policies discriminating against samesex couples raise serious constitutional issues. This is significant
because the Court has held that ambiguities in an immigration
statute should be interpreted so as to avoid " 'serious doubt' as to its
constitutionality.' "27 A uniform place-of-celebration rule would avoid
such doubts.
III. ADAMS V. HOWERTON iSDEAD
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit decided Adams v. Howerton,28 a
fluke of a case, which has been cited repeatedly over the last thirty
years, largely because of its flukishness. Decided fourteen years before
DOMA was enacted and twenty years before any U.S. state actually
recognized same-sex marriage, Adams discounted the state Attorney
General's opinion that Colorado same-sex marriages were not valid in
that state, and proceeded to hold that a U.S. citizen's "marriage" to
another man would not qualify for immigration purposes even if it
were valid. 29 Of course, that case was the last word on a hypothetical
issue based on a premise (a valid same-sex marriage under state law),
which would not exist for another two decades. Despite repeated
30
attempts to resuscitate it, including a recent New York Times op-ed,
1
3
Adams is dead and should remain so.
The reasoning of Adams was originally a three-legged stool, but
now it has no leg left to stand on. The Ninth Circuit held that the
Adams-Sullivan marriage could not be valid under federal
immigration law for three reasons: (1) immigration statutes at the

26. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2709-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001)(citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932)).
28. 673 F.2d 1036 (1982), cert. denied 102 S.Ct. 2393 (1982).
29. Id.
30. Aberto R. Gonzales & David N. Strange, What the Court Didn't Say, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 2013, at A23.
31. In addition to its specific holding, a much-cited two-part general test of marriage
validity described in Adams also seems to have been replaced by recognition of a more useful
three-part test, even in the Ninth Circuit. See Agyeman v. INS, 296 F. 3d 871 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)
(looking at (1) legal validity; (2) bona fides; and (3) no public policy exception); see also Titshaw,
supra note 1 at 550-53 (distilling the test employed by courts as (1) validity where celebrated; (2)
state or federal categorical public policy exceptions; and (3) bona tides of the particular marriage
in question). If immigration authorities extended the uniform place-of-celebration rule to all
marriage contexts, only federal public policy exceptions would remain relevant. But there is still
an argument that marriages recognized in no U.S. state (e.g., minors under the age of thirteen or
polygamists) would not be valid under the INA, even without an express federal policy on point.)
See Titshaw, supra note 1, at 570.
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time barred admission into the United States of foreign "sexual
deviants" such as homosexuals, expressing a clear federal policy
incompatible with same-sex marriage; (2) the court was deferring to
Immigration and Naturalization Service interpretation of the INA to
reject such marriages; and (3) Congress did not intend to deviate from
the "ordinary, contemporary, common" dictionary definition of
"marriage" in order to benefit same-sex spouses. 32
The first two rationales originally provided a valid basis for the
decision in Adams. Yet they are no longer valid. The first rationale
was superseded in 1990, when Congress repealed the "sexual deviant"
ground of inadmissibility. The second rationale actually favors samesex spouses now that immigration officials have begun recognizing
their marriages.
The third rationale in Adams was always misguided, but that
was difficult to see from a vantage point two decades away from actual
state-sanctioned, same-sex marriage. At the time, the Court's
unprecedented construction of a specifically anti-gay, federal
definition of marriage (inferred from Congressional silence) coincided
with the law in all fifty states. If one did not squint too hard, it
appeared that Adams was merely following the customary practice of
deference to state family law definitions. But the advent of state samesex marriage two decades later cleared the fog. In a time when some,
but not all states recognize same-sex marriage, Congressional silence
more logically implies the intent to follow longstanding precedent and
look to state family law.
Even if one employed the Adams court's approach of examining
dictionary definitions of "marriage" to determine its meaning, one
could find a new answer. Widespread movement toward marriage
equality in the U.S. and other English speaking countries has altered
the common meaning of "marriage" so that many dictionaries now
33
expressly include same-sex couples within their definitions.
In a world without Adams or DOMA, the Obama
administration has appropriately clarified the spousal choice-of-law
issue in favor of a uniform place-of-celebration rule, but it has not
completely resolved the other two immigration questions posed in the
second paragraph of this essay: How will civil unions or registered
partnerships be treated? How about children born to spouses or
registered partners in same-sex couples?

32. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040.
33. See e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/marriage
(Definition: (a) (1): the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as husband or wife in
a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law (2): the state of being united to a
person of the same sex in a relationship like that of a traditional marriage.).
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IV. CHILDREN OF SAME-SEX SPOUSES AFTER WINDSOR
United States v. Windsor allows recognition of many parentchild relationships that were invisible under Section 3 of DOMA.
Because the definition of "stepchild" in the INA expressly references
the "marriage creating the relationship,' 4 lesbian and gay
stepparents presumably did not count under DOMA. Now the State
Department will recognize these stepparents for immigration
purposes. 35 Children born to married same-sex parents should also be
recognized as "born in wedlock" for immigration purposes. 36 However,
the State Department has drawn the opposite conclusion with regard
to U.S. citizenship transmission upon birth abroad.
Questions of immigration and citizenship are based on
different titles of the INA with different definitions of "parent" and
"child."37 And the State Department takes an extremely limited view
of parent-child relationships in the context of automatic citizenship
upon birth abroad, requiring a genetic link between a child and her
U.S. citizen parent. 38 As an increasing number of modern families use
assisted reproductive technology to conceive children, this leads to
absurd and harsh results. If a U.S. citizen and her Brazilian wife have
a child abroad, the child's citizenship would depend entirely upon
whose egg was fertilized, even if the U.S. citizen carries and gives
birth to her wife's genetic child. This approach also applies to
different-sex spouses: If a U.S. citizen wife gives birth abroad to a
baby conceived in vitro using a donated egg and the sperm of her
foreign national husband, that child is not a citizen. This can result in
long delays, permanent family separation, and even stateless children.
The State Department's genetic fixation even extends to
categorizing children whose "geneticparents were not married at the
time of birth" as "born out of wedlock" for citizenship transmission
purposes. 39 This includes children of different-sex married couples who
use donated eggs or sperm. It includes all children born to same-sex
spouses, even after Windsor.

34. 8U.S.C. § 1101(b)(B).
35. FAQs for Post-DOMA, supra note 13.
36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(A); Scott Titshaw, Sorry Ma'am, Your Baby is an Alien: Outdated
ImmigrationRules andAssisted Reproductive Technology, 12 FLA. CoASTAL L. REV. 47, 118 (2010).
37. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b) (defining "child" and "parent" for purposes of immigration
under INA Titles Iand II) with 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (c)(1) (defining them for purposes of Title III).
38. See Titshaw, supra note 36, at 102-05; see also 7 FAM §§1131.4-1 and 1131.4-2 (focusing
on the source of eggs and sperm to determine birth out of wedlock).
39. 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 1445.5-7(a) (categorizing such children under 8 U.S.C. §
1409, which covers those "born out of wedlock") (emphasis added).
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Only the strongest legal rationale would justify such
discrimination against children of same-sex marriages now that those
marriages provide immigration benefits to the parents. Yet, there is
no such rationale.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the State
Department's genetic essentialist approach to citizenship acquisition.
It focuses instead on state or foreign family-law to determine whether
a child was "born out of wedlock." 40 Children born "out of wedlock" fall
under INA § 309, which expressly requires a "blood relationship" for
citizenship transmission, while section INA §301 is silent on that
issue. Reasoning that Congress meant this distinction, the court
refused to require a "blood relationship" for citizenship transmission
from a married U.S. citizen to a child born abroad to him and his wife,
the child's biological mother. This textual analysis is based on wellestablished cannons of statutory construction. The State Department's
approach, on the other hand, seems to stem from a literal translation
of jus sanguinis (law of the blood), 4 1 a term derived not from the INA,
but from sixth-century scholars who drafted the Justinian Code, a
highly unlikely source for analyzing the results of in vitro fertilization.
The Ninth Circuit's approach also constitutes better policy. It
avoids arbitrary and cruel distinctions, promotes the fundamental
INA policy of family unification, and results in fewer stateless
children. It is also more consistent with Supreme Court opinions in
Windsor and other cases, which focus on state law to determine family
42
statuses not expressly defined by federal statute.
Unfortunately, since the State Department decides most cases
of citizenship transmission upon birth abroad, its misguided approach
continues to create arbitrary and unfair results. However, this
approach is not required by statute, and the State Department is
currently reconsidering it. 43 In the meantime, Windsor will allow
many families to immigrate together to the United States based on
stepparent-stepchild relationships while awaiting clarification of the
citizenship issue.

40. See Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005); Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2000). These Ninth Circuit cases dealt with the children of old-fashioned nonmarital sexual relationships, but the court expressly rejected the State Department's genetic
relationship requirement for U.S. citizenship transmission to children born in wedlock, and its
reasoning is even stronger in the context of planned pregnancies using assisted reproductive
technology.
41. See 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 1111(a)(2); Id. § 1131.1-1(a).
42. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2690-93 (2013); Sylva v. Ballentine, 351
U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
43. See 7 Foreign Affairs Manual §1441.1(e) (added May 3, 2013) (indicating that State is
reviewing its policy on reproductive technology and citizenship).
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V. CIVIL UNIONS AND OTHER NON-MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS

The State Department has announced that it will not "at this
44
time," consider civil unions or domestic partnerships as "marriages."
This may change upon further consideration since it already
recognizes cohabitation as "the functional equivalent of marriage" for
some purposes if "[1]ocal laws recognize such cohabitation as being
45
fully equivalent in every respect to a traditional legal marriage."
Immigration officials might at least extend spousal recognition to
legally registered couples in jurisdictions that define partners in civil
unions as "spouses."

46

The uniform place-of-celebration standard allows most couples
to travel and marry elsewhere and then qualify for spousal
47
immigration benefits even if they reside in non-recognition states.
Therefore, many couples in civil unions or domestic partnerships now
need only marry to qualify.
Yet it is too late for some partners in legal, non-marital unions
to marry. The widow of a U.S. citizen normally qualifies for
permanent residence in the United States. 48 If a California domestic
partner died before Windsor was decided, however, it is too late for
marriage.49 Perhaps immigration officials will recognize marriage-like
civil unions in such compelling circumstances.
A child's "birth out of wedlock" and resulting immigration
disadvantages may also be impossible to cure through a subsequent
marriage. There is, however, a strong argument for treating children
born into civil unions and other legal relationships carrying
presumptions of parenthood as "born in wedlock" under the INA. The
choice is binary, aimed solely at a "yes" or "no" answer regarding
whether a parent-child relationship exists. The terms are not defined
in the INA. Where state family law answers the question "yes," with
all related legal rights and duties, federal recognition seems more
50
appropriate than the alternative.
44. FAQs for Post-Defense of MarriageAct, supra note 13.
45. 9 Foreign Affairs Manual §40.1 N1.2.
46. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37: 1-33 (2013)(expressly defining the terms "spouse" and
even "marriage" under state law to cover civil union relationships.).
47. Given the "public charge" basis for inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. §1182(4), it is unlikely
many otherwise-qualified couples will not be able to afford the trip.
48. See 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
49. The right to marry ends at death except in France, which allows posthumous marriage
for some purposes. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 763, 780
(2009).
50. See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 201, 214 - 217, 257 n. 238 (2009) (describing current presumptions of parentage and
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If the State Department someday recognizes children born to
same-sex spouses for automatic citizenship purposes, the issue of birth
"out of wedlock" could be determinative in that context as well. The
binary statutory choice regarding automatic citizenship is between
birth "out of wedlock" and everything else (rather than birth "in
51
wedlock"), making the argument for recognition even stronger.
Thanks to the Supreme Court, immigration authorities have
been able to catch up with modern family-law and the reality of samesex spouses. Now it is time for them to catch up with the realities of
relationships between same- and different-sex parents and their
children conceived through assisted reproductive technology.

problematic ambiguities regarding rebuttal as well as the District of Columbia law stating that
'[a] child born to parents in a domestic partnership shall be treated for all legal purposes as a
child born in wedlock.").
51. See Titshaw, supra note 3, at 483-84 (arguing for such recognition based on the textual
distinction between the two alternative provisions for citizenship transmission upon birth abroad
under 8 U.S.C. §§1401 and 1409).

